Homeland Security Group

WASHINGTON – The Department of Justice today announced the final guidelines for Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The Guidelines provide necessary tools for states, the District of Columbia, territories and certain federally recognized Indian tribes to incorporate SORNA minimum requirements into their sex offender registration and notification programs.

“The Department is pleased to provide guidance to states and other covered jurisdictions in complying with the Adam Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Sedgwick of the Office of Justice Programs. “These Guidelines will provide valuable implementation strategies to enhance their abilities to respond to crimes against children and adults and prevent sex offenders who have been released back into the community from victimizing others.”

Today’s final guidelines provide direction and assistance to all jurisdictions in their efforts to meet the minimum standards of the Adam Walsh Act. Since the enactment of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act in 1994, all states, the District of Columbia and two territories currently have some form of a sex offender registration and notification program. On July 27, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act which dramatically enhanced the effectiveness of current programs by establishing a new comprehensive set of minimum standards for sex offender registration and notification throughout the United States.

The Department of Justice published proposed guidelines for the SORNA provisions of the Adam Walsh Act in the Federal Register on May 30, 2007, and were available for public comment until August 1, 2007. More than 275 comments were received from criminal justice professionals, sex offender registration officials, state and local governments, tribal communities, Congress and the general public. Based on the comments received, the final guidelines provide general principles for jurisdictions working to implement SORNA and further clarification on several topics including the treatment of juveniles, retroactivity, tribal issues, information subject to Web site posting and duration of registration.

On July 30—August 1, 2008 the Office of Justice Programs’ (OJP) Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking (SMART) will host its second annual National Symposium on Sex Offender Management and Accountability in Baltimore. The symposium will bring together state and federal lawmakers, top state, local and tribal government officials, policy advisors, law enforcement, parole and probation officers, prosecutors, and frontline professionals who monitor, register, track and manage sex offenders. The meeting will include special tracks that focus on policy, enforcement, emerging issues, and topics related specifically to sex offender management in Indian Country and tribal governments.

The final guidelines and additional information on significant changes can be found at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart.

The Office of Justice Programs, headed by Acting Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey L. Sedgwick, provides federal leadership in developing the nation’s capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and assist victims. OJP has five component bureaus: the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the Bureau of Justice Statistics; the National Institute of Justice; the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and the Office for Victims of Crime. Additionally, OJP has two program offices: the Community Capacity Development Office, which incorporates the Weed and Seed strategy, and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART). More information can be found at http://www.ojp.gov.

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From a recent GAO report.

GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement:

• Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze data for participating seaports.

• Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP lacks information on host nation equipment and practices.

• Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased security.

• Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of implementing 100 percent scanning.

• Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time and may be difficult to access.

• Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program.

• Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require international agreements for transfer to CBP officials.

• Consistency with risk management: International partners state that 100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management principles and diverts resources away from other security threats.

• Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to trade.

The full report is available HERE.

From a recent GAO Report:

DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and responsibilities and capabilities for emergency preparedness efforts in key policy documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition between presidential administrations.

DHS prepared initial versions of key policy documents that describe what should be done and by whom (National Response Plan in 2004), how it should be done (the National Incident Management System in 2004) and how well it should be done (the interim National Preparedness Goal in 2005). DHS subsequently developed and issued revisions to these documents to improve and enhance its national-level policies, such as the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2007 which was the successor to the interim National Preparedness Goal.

Most recently, DHS developed the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, which became effective in March 2008. This framework describes the doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts.

Clarifying roles and responsibilities will be especially critical as a result of the coming change in administrations and the associated transition of key federal officials with homeland security preparedness and response roles. To cope with the absence of many political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition plans.

To assist in planning to execute an efficient and effective administration transition, DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to identify key roles and responsibilities for the Department and its homeland security partners for responding to disasters during the transition between administrations.

DHS is still developing operational plans to guide other federal agencies’ response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities. Two essential supplements to the new National Response Framework—response guides for federal partners and an integrated planning system—are still under development. Also, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the nation’s overall preparedness based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet completed an inventory of all federal response capabilities.

The measures and metrics associated with these targeted capabilities are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, DHS policy does not direct development of these capabilities to address national priorities for federal agencies. For example, for the national priority to “Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities” the National Preparedness Guidelines state that communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics established for targeted capabilities; federal agencies’ interoperability is not addressed.

The full report is available HERE.

Yesterday while scanning the news, I came across a blog entry that addressed the issue of Glorifying Eco-Terrorism. The entry was based on an article detailing the activities of a prior Canadian Coast Guardsman and “Eco-Warrior”; also an original member of Greenpeace. Apparently, this guy has been ramming other ships at sea as a protest.

What really caught my attention were some of the mindless comments made by one blogger:

“PAUL WATSON is a HERO. He’s done what you don’t have the balls to do.”

Well…I reject the concept that a person can engage in breaking the law because it aligns with their own belief. I’m getting a bit tired of irresponsible behavior by people.

Here’s my reply to the blog comment:

While I’m NOT going to stand on the side of the road that thinks that ramming and sinking ships is a good thing, I DO believe that we have a certain responsibility to maintain our environment.

I realize that some will stand on the sidelines and yell, “Yeah!! That was cool. Another boat was sunk.” Well, frankly, I think that idea is completely counterintuitive to the goal of maintaining our globe. (I really would like to say that idea is just plain stupid…but that wouldn’t be nice…so I won’t)

Having been a maritime investigator, I’ve been out there when a ship goes down. Does anybody have any idea how much toxic junk enters our seas when that happens? Does somebody actually think that it just evaporates because it was put there to support their unthinking ideals? When a ship is lost, that’s the first thing that investigators look for…the oil sheen and which way it drifted to determine where it may have originated from.

Don’t get me wrong. I’m all for protecting the environment…just smartly.

In fact, in my new book, “Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System” I devote an entire chapter to the issue of ballast water and the deadly non-indigenous species that impact our economy and the ecosystem. This is an issue that brought President Clinton to write an Executive Order with the intent of bringing about some regulation. Unfortunately, few listened and everyday tons of dangerous biotic invaders cause us harm.

So rather than cheering the sinking of boats by people who feel they have a right to disregard the law, perhaps folks might serve their cause better by asking their Congressman why they failed to support regulation that causes our world so much harm.

That’s just my two cents.

Anthony M. Davis
Author: Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System

The following is the Executive Summary for the DEA’s new report addressing the use of Intelligence Analysts. We use intelligence analysis to categorize the capabilities, understand networks and take action against an adversary in war. These same methodologies are vital against those transnational criminal organizations earning substantive profits from drugs.

A copy of the following report is available on the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) Website HERE:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The gathering and use of intelligence is an important element in the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) efforts to identify and disrupt illegal drug trafficking. Accurate and up-to-date intelligence is needed to assess the operations and vulnerabilities of criminal drug networks, to systematically interdict illegal contraband, and to evaluate the impact of illegal drug activities. Intelligence is also needed to identify new methods of illegal drug trafficking and to establish long-range enforcement strategies.

DEA management also uses intelligence for operational decision-making, resource deployment, and policy planning. The DEA also shares information and expertise with other members of the intelligence community, as well as other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, to help identify and disrupt illegal drug trafficking.

The collection of drug related information is primarily the responsibility of DEA’s Special Agents, while the collation and analysis of this information for the purpose of producing and disseminating meaningful intelligence is primarily the responsibility of the DEA Intelligence Program. The DEA employs intelligence research specialists, also known as intelligence analysts, to produce intelligence from drug related information collected from various sources. The number of DEA intelligence analysts has grown from 11 since the DEA’s inception in 1973 to 710 stationed around the world as of March 15, 2008.

DEA intelligence analysts synthesize information on illicit drug trafficking from a variety of sources, including DEA investigations, seized documents, surveillance reports, informants, confidential sources, and court ordered wiretaps. Intelligence analysts assess and summarize this information and provide it to DEA Special Agents; supervisory DEA personnel; United States Attorneys; grand juries; federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies; and other intelligence agencies. In addition to its intelligence analysts, the DEA currently has four contract reports officers working in the DEA Policy and Liaison Section.

Reports officers review incoming DEA reports of investigation that have a foreign nexus and develop reports, known as reports officer cables, for the intelligence community.

by Anthony M. Davis

May 10^th was Election Day for one million Sri Lankan people eligible to vote in the eastern district of Batticaloa. Before this day, the polls in this area remained closed for 20 years. The Sri Lankan government hoped the vote would suppress the power of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighting since 1983 to gain independence.

Yet, for the Tamil Tigers, this would be a good day to strike against the government. Terror attacks are not so much about killing as it is a public display that the government is unable to provide safety and security for their citizens. The LTTE understands the concept of tactical momentum and with 25 years of terror attacks and unrest, the Sri Lankan government knows that all too well. On land, the LTTE has consistently attacked, and at sea by the Sea Tigers, the maritime front of the rebel force ha plagued the Sri Lankan government.

The Sri Lankan Navy set up extra protection establishing Trincomalee Harbor as a “high security zone.” This area has seen assaults before and now with a 24-hour security posture the Navy claimed they were ready. Yet, during the pre-dawn hours, attackers from the LTTE’s Kangkai Amaran Battalion entered the harbor undetected.

This time the target was the 262-foot cargo vessel, MV Invincible (A520). The cargo ship became property of the Sri Lankan Navy after an unsuccessful migrant smuggling attempt in 2003. Now the vessel was loaded with military weapons and equipment to support the Sri Lankan fighting force against the LTTE in the north.

An investigation continues in an attempt to explain how the LTTE managed to enter a heavily defended harbor and attach underwater explosives to the hull of the vessel. The ship sunk within minutes of the blast. The sound of the explosion resonated throughout the local area and in effect, continues today as security professionals scramble to prevent a reoccurrence. If the LTTE can operate at will in the face of a tight security posture, the safety of other maritime areas in the region are at risk.

Investigators are looking at the possibility that the rebels entered the harbor onboard a local Indian Oil Company vessel. As regular operators within the area, the oil company boats are not checked. As an alternative consideration, the LTTE members may have been insiders working within the harbor.

The Sri Lankan investigators must quickly determine how this attack was precipitated. Otherwise, other targets within the harbor, including the co-located naval base will eventually be hit.

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The Author: Anthony M. Davis is the author of “Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System.” He is the Founder of the Homeland Security Group.

CBP has strengthened its policies for granting benefits to importers, C-TPAT’s largest member sector, and is working to improve its policies for members in other trade sectors. For example, starting in March 2005, CBP began requiring members in 9 out of the 10 trade sectors to meet minimum security criteria and it plans to finalize criteria for the tenth trade sector by mid-2008.

CBP has also introduced a process that awards benefits for C-TPAT importers on a three-tiered basis, depending on validation of their security practices. CBP officials told us that they interpret the benefit tiering provisions of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 to apply mainly to importers. Nevertheless, CBP considered implementing tiered benefits for other trade sectors, but it has not been able to identify additional benefits to offer nonimporters in a tiered structure.

CBP has taken steps to improve the security validation process, but still faces challenges in verifying that C-TPAT members’ security practices meet minimum criteria. CBP has sought to strengthen the validation process by providing appropriate guidance and developing a portable, electronic instrument to help ensure that validation information is consistently collected, documented, and uniformly applied to decisions regarding the awarding of benefits to C-TPAT members.

However, the usefulness of the instrument is limited due to its default “no” responses. Specifically, if a response is marked “no,” it is unclear whether a security specialist, who has the discretion to answer or not answer individual questions, intentionally answered the question or if the response was an automatic default. This factor limits the ability of CBP to validate security practices at member companies.

CBP has taken actions to address C-TPAT management and staffing challenges, such as implementing a human capital plan, a records management system, and performance measures. While these actions have addressed a number of challenges, others remain. In particular, CBP’s records management system does not include interim processing dates—such as the date that security specialists send companies the 30-day validation notification letter—to enable management or others to determine CBP’s compliance with program requirements.

Further, although CBP has developed performance measures for facilitating the flow of commerce, it has not developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of C-TPAT’s efforts to improve supply chain security.

The Full Report is Available HERE.

From a new GAO Report:

Efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: (1) a strong requirements determination process, (2) quality in all clearance processes, (3) metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. In February 2008, GAO noted that a sound requirements process is important because requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily.

For example, the cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. Also, changing a position’s clearance level from secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold. Building quality throughout the clearance process could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity governmentwide.

However, agencies have paid little attention to this factor despite GAO’s 2006 recommendation to place more emphasis on quality. For example, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) February 2007 report on security clearances documented quality with a single metric in only one of the six phases of the process. Further, OMB did not discuss the development or existence of any metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or products in its February 2008 report.

Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; thus, government resources may be used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Federal agencies’ efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize timeliness, but additional metrics should be developed to provide a fuller picture of the performance of the clearance process.

GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative reports, staff’s and customers’ perceptions of the process, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which provides guidelines for the speed of completing clearances and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress.

Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes could enable more-informed congressional oversight. Reform efforts should identify long-term funding requirements to implement proposed changes, so that decision makers can compare and prioritize alternate reform proposals in times of fiscal constraints. The absence of long-term funding requirements to implement reforms would limit decision makers’—in the executive and legislative branches—ability to carry out their budgetary development and oversight functions.

The Full Report is available HERE.

U.S. ARMY TRANSLATOR SENTENCED TO 121 MONTHS’ IMPRISONMENT
FOR UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING IRAQI INSURGENCY AND FOR USING A FALSE IDENTITY

Defendant’s United States Citizenship is Revoked

BROOKLYN, NY – A U.S. Army contract translator was sentenced today to 121 months of imprisonment for illegally possessing national defense documents, and using a false identity to procure his United States citizenship and to gain access to classified military materials. In addition, the court issued an order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) stripping the defendant of his United States citizenship on the basis of his conviction for unlawful procurement of citizenship.

The proceedings were held before United States District Judge Edward R. Korman at the U.S. Courthouse in Brooklyn, New York.

Previously, on February 14, 2007, the defendant, whose true identity is still unknown and who goes by various names including, Abdulhakeem Nour, Abu Hakim, Noureddine Malki, Almaliki Nour, and Almalik Nour Eddin, pleaded guilty to the unauthorized possession of classified documents charge, and on December 20, 2005, pleaded guilty to the false identity charge.  The government’s investigation was conducted by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).

In August 2003, the defendant used a false identity to apply for and gain a position as an Arabic translator for the L-3 Titan Corp., which provides translation services in Iraq for U.S. military personnel.  He then used the same false identity fraudulently to obtain “Secret” and then “Top Secret” security clearances.  Subsequently, during assignments in Iraq, the defendant took classified documents from the U.S. Army without authorization.

While assigned to an intelligence group in the 82nd Airborne Division of the U.S. Army at Al Taqqadam Air Base, he downloaded a classified document and took hard copies of several other classified documents. The documents detail the 82nd Airborne’s mission in Iraq in regard to insurgent activity, such as coordinates of insurgent locations upon which the U.S. Army was preparing to fire in January 2004, and U.S. Army plans for protecting Sunni Iraqis traveling on their pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in late January 2004.

During a later deployment to a U.S. Army base near Najaf, Iraq, the defendant photographed a classified battle map identifying U.S. troop routes used in August 2004 during the bloody battle of Najaf, where the U.S. and Iraqi security forces sustained serious casualties.  In September 2005, the JTTF recovered these classified documents during a search of the defendant’s Brooklyn apartment.  One of the documents remains classified and is not described here.

“Those who would compromise military plans and intelligence will be met with aggressive investigation and prosecution,” stated United States Attorney Benton J. Campbell. Mr. Campbell extended his grateful appreciation to the FBI, the New York City Police Department, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for spearheading the government’s investigation, and thanked the U.S. Department of Defense for its assistance.

The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys John Buretta and Jeffrey Knox.

(Source: Department of Justice)